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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
At his sentencing hearing for DUI, the district court imposed a ten-year sentence
with two years fixed, on Mr. Steelsmith, and retained jurisdiction. The district court also
entered a restitution order.

However, it did not impose any fines, costs, or driver's

license suspension at that time, deciding that it wanted to wait to do so until after
Mr. Steelsmith finished his rider.

The district court remanded Mr. Steelsmith to the

custody of the Department of Correction at the end of the sentencing hearing.
When the district court ultimately relinquished jurisdiction, it added the new,
previously-unimposed punishments of a fine, court costs, and a driver's license
suspension to Mr. Steelsmith's sentence. Mr. Steelsmith appealed, asserting that the
district court did not have the authority (i.e., the jurisdiction) to impose those additional
punishments when it relinquished jurisdiction and by doing so, it violated his state and
federal constitutional rights to be free from double jeopardy. He also argued that, in
regard to the length of his sentence (both as initially imposed and after the denial of his
I.C.R. Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion), the district court abused its discretion by
not sufficiently considering the mitigating evidence present in his case.
The State's responses to Mr. Steelsmith's arguments in that regard ignore
well-established Idaho law. It attempts to argue that each individual punishment was
analyzed as a separate aspect of sentencing, imposition of which could be individually
delayed until after the period of retained jurisdiction.

However, the Idaho appellate

courts have clearly stated that the sentencing courts only have jurisdiction to impose a
sentence, and that occurs before the period of retained jurisdiction begins.
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Imposing

additional punishments at a second proceeding exceeds that authority and violates
double jeopardy protections. The State also attempts to argue that because execution
of a sentence subject to a period of retained jurisdiction is not effectuated until after
relinquishment, the sentence was not actually executed before the period of retained
jurisdiction. It makes this argument despite the fact that the Idaho appellate courts have
clearly held that a sentence is executed when defendant is remanded to the custody of
the Department of Correction. Furthermore, Idaho appellate courts have held that, in
regard to periods of retained jurisdiction, if no action is taken by the district court, the
defendant continues to serve his underlying sentence, indicating that the underlying
sentence is in effect (i.e., executed) throughout the period of retained jurisdiction.
As the State's responses in regard to the district court's jurisdiction and
double jeopardy are directly contrary to established Idaho law, they do not discredit
Mr. Steelsmith's arguments, nor do they demonstrate that the district court did not
exceed its jurisdiction or violate the double jeopardy protections by imposing these
additional punishments after the period of retained jurisdiction. Because of those errors,
this Court should vacate the improperly-imposed punishments.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Steelsmith's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court erred by imposing various punishments at the rider
review hearing in violation of jurisdictional limitations and the state and federal
constitutional protections against double jeopardy.

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction by
not sufficiently considering the factors which indicated that Mr. Steelsmith would
be able to succeed in a less structured environment.

3.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Steelsmith's
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence in light of the new evidence he
presented .1

1 In regard to Issues 2 and 3, the State's responses concerning the excessiveness
of Mr. Steelsmith's sentence are not remarkable, and as such, no further reply is
necessary in regard to those issues. Accordingly, Mr. Steelsmith simply refers the
Court back to pages 18-33 of his Appellant's Brief.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Imposing Various Punishments At The Rider Review
Hearing In Violation Of Jurisdictional Limitations And The State And Federal
Constitutional Protections Against Double Jeopardy

A.

Introduction
In this case, the district court imposed a sentence, which included a period of

retained jurisdiction, on Mr. Steelsmith following his plea of guilty to DUI. That sentence
included a prison term and restitution, but did not include fines, costs, or a driver's
license suspension.

Instead, the district court decided it would not impose those

punishments until after the period of retained jurisdiction.

The district court then

executed that sentence (consisting of a prison sentence and a restitution order) when it
remanded Mr. Steelsmith to the custody of the county sheriff with orders to transport
him forthwith to the custody of the board. When Mr. Steelsmith returned from his period
of retained jurisdiction, the district court relinquished jurisdiction and increased the
sentence with the new, additional punishments it had not imposed at the sentencing
hearing.

In doing so, it not only exceeded its jurisdiction, but also committed

fundamental error, violating clearly on the record Mr. Steelsmith's unwaived federal and
state constitutional protections from double jeopardy.
The State attempts to justify the district court's actions by contending that they
constituted individual aspects of sentencing or individual sentencing rulings, and as
such, imposition and/or execution of each could be delayed until the end of the period of
retained jurisdiction.

As to double jeopardy, it contends that Mr. Steelsmith had not

been in original jeopardy because he did not have "a legitimate expectation in the
finality of his sentence."

4

The State's arguments on both fronts are untenable. Its arguments in regard to
the district court's jurisdiction ignore the fundamental premise that sentencing only
occurs once, at the sentencing hearing, and it is at that time that the entire sentence is
imposed (i.e., all sentencing decisions are made) and that subsequent increases to that
originally-imposed sentence are beyond the district court's jurisdiction. It also ignores
the long-standing rule that a sentence is executed when the defendant is remanded to
the custody of the board.

Additionally, the State's arguments ignore the precedent

which holds that a period of retained jurisdiction only grants the district court limited
continuing jurisdiction, which is coextensive to that of the Department of Correction,
and, as such, does not extend to allow for increases in the penalties originally imposed.
For both of these reasons, the district court did not have the jurisdiction to
impose new, additional punishments at a second hearing, which is precisely what it
erroneously did in this case. Furthermore, the State's arguments in regard to double
jeopardy ignore the Idaho precedent which clearly demonstrates that a sentence
imposed prior to a period of retained jurisdiction is final, so much so that the defendant
is able to appeal that sentence and he does not have a cognizable due process right to
a hearing in regard to the potential relinquishment of jurisdiction and the resuming of
that sentence. Therefore, Mr. Steelsmith did have a legitimate expectation in the finality
of that sentence sufficient to support a double jeopardy claim.
As none of the State's arguments are meritorious in regard to these issues, this
Court should remedy the district court's erroneous actions by vacating these
inappropriately-imposed additional punishments.

5

B.

The District Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction to Add Fines, Costs, And A Driver's
License Suspension After The Period Of Retained Jurisdiction
The State does not contest the fundamental premise that "a district court loses

jurisdiction to modify or alter a sentence once that sentence has been imposed and
executed.,,2

(See Resp. Br., p.5 (citing McFarland v. Hunt, 79 Idaho 262, 266

(1957); State v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 581, 585 (1980)).) "[A] sentence is imposed when
initially pronounced, even though jurisdiction is retained under I.C. § 19-2601 (4) or the
sentence is suspended." (Resp. Br., pp.6-7 (quoting State v. Alvarado, 132 Idaho 248,
249 (Ct. App. 1998).) Despite recognizing this authority, the State attempts to argue
that Mr. Steelsmith's sentence had not been imposed or executed (at least in regard to
the fine, costs, and driver's license suspension). It is mistaken on both counts.

1. As Established In Accordance With Precedent, Mr. Steelsmith's Entire
Sentence Was Imposed At The Sentencing Hearing, And The Authority To
Impose That Sentence Could Not Be Deferred To The Relinquishment
Hearing
The State disregards established precedent (i.e., McFarland, Johnson, and
Alvarado) and argues that the district court could impose a sentence and increase it
later by deferring "one or more aspects of a sentence" or "some of its sentencing
rulings" to-wit, imposition of additional punishments. 3

(See Resp. Br., pp.7-9.)

The

To the extent that this is an argument about "the district court's jurisdiction,"
Mr. Steelsmith recognizes the difference between an entire lack of the overarching
subject matter jurisdiction and a lack of authority to act in a certain way within that
overarching subject matter jurisdiction. State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 375
(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Jensen, 149 Idaho 758, 761 (Ct. App. 2010).
3 The State relies on the recitation of the facts in State v. Ward, 145 Idaho 68, 71
(et. App. 2000), to support its premise that the district court can delay imposition of a
sentence. (See Resp. Br., p.8.) However, in Ward, the district court delayed imposition
of the entire sentence until after the defendant had been given a sufficient opportunity to
argue that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. See Ward, 145 Idaho at 71.
2
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State's position is contrary to established Idaho law, which provides that the district
court's only opportunity to impose a sentence (i.e., make determinations about all
aspects of the sentence or make all sentencing rulings) is at the sentencing hearing.
See State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 142-43 (2001). The Idaho Supreme Court has

unambiguously stated that, when a sentence includes a period of retained jurisdiction,
"[sJentencing occurs before the period of retained jurisdiction begins, not when
jurisdiction is relinquished." Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, the Court of Appeals

has explicitly held that the established principle in Idaho is: "a sentence is imposed
when initially pronounced, even though jurisdiction is retained under I.C. § 19-2601 (4)
or the sentence is suspended." Alvarado, 132 Idaho at 249. To that end, "when, under
a judgment, a valid sentence has been put into execution, the trial court cannot amend
or modify it, either during or after the term of court at which the sentence was
pronounced, and that any attempt so to do is of no effect." McFarland, 79 Idaho at 266;
but see State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 264 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the district

court does have limited jurisdiction to modify an imposed sentence, but only insofar as
to reduce that sentence pursuant to Rule 35; otherwise, it can only resume the original
sentence, which impliedly was already imposed). As such, there is only one point at
which the sentence, or any component, aspect, or ruling thereof, may be imposed - the
sentencing hearing. Id.

Once the district court had resolved the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, then it
proceeded to impose the entire sentence. Id. As such, Ward does not stand for or
support (or even discuss) the premise that the district court may bifurcate the imposition
of sentence. See id. To the extent that the recitation of the procedural facts in Ward is
precedential, it only recognizes that the district court may delay imposition of the entire
sentence if it is necessary to resolve a pending motion. See id.
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The State attempts to circumvent Coassolo's and Alvarado's clear holdings by
arguing that the Idaho Supreme Court did not expressly say that a district could not
defer a sentencing ruling until after the period of retained jurisdiction. 4

(Resp.

Br., pp.8-9.) Other than the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court has actually forestalled

that argument by holding that "sentencing" (i.e., the imposition of the entire sentence,
and thus all components, aspects, or rulings thereof) does not occur at relinquishment,
Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 142-43; Alvarado, 132 Idaho at 249, the State's inference,

arising from the double negative ("the Idaho Supreme Court did not say we could not do
this"), is wholly improper and contrary to the rest of Idaho law. See, e.g., McFarland, 79
Idaho at 266; Johnson, 101 Idaho at 585; Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 142-43; Alvarado, 132
Idaho at 249; Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 264.
Further to that point, the statute under which Mr. Steelsmith was sentenced,
I.C. § 18-8005(6) (R., p.61), has five components to the sentence that may be imposed

To this end, the State argues that it is within the district court's inherent power to
regulate its calendar to delay parts of its decisions to promote judicial efficiency
(presumably reasoning that the district court is somehow being more efficient in
resolving the case by not deciding all sentencing issues at one time, but instead,
requiring a second hearing to finish up what should have been done at the first hearing).
(See Resp. Br., p.8 (citing Oep't of Labor and Indus. Servo V. East Idaho Mills, Inc., 111
Idaho 137, 138-39 (Ct. App. 1986).) However, the authority to which East Idaho Mifls
refers arose under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16 governing pre-trial activities. East
Idaho Milfs, 111 Idaho at 136-37. Even if a parallel could be drawn between the
authority of the court in criminal, as opposed to civil, matters (for example, the
defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial could impact the district court's
unfettered ability to control its calendar or do substantial justice in the case), the critical
fact in Mr. Steelsmith's case is that it deals with a post-conviction issue, not a pre-trial
issue. Thus, East Idaho Milfs is distinguishable and the rule articulated by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Coassolo remains the only precedent on point: the district court's
post-conviction authority to regulate its calendar is expressly limited. See Coassolo,
136 Idaho at 142-43. The district court is only authorized to impose the sentence or
make decisions regarding the aspects of sentencing, at the sentencing hearing, not
after a period of retained jurisdiction. Id.
4
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pursuant to a conviction or guilty plea under that statute. I.C. § 18-8005(6). As such,
each is a part of the sentence for the identified offense, not a sentence unto itself, even
though each constitutes a different punishment. See id. Therefore, since sentencing
(i.e., the imposition of the sentence) occurs prior to the period of retained jurisdiction,

all components or aspects of the sentence must necessarily be imposed at the
sentencing hearing. 5 See Coasso/o, 136 Idaho at 142-43; Alvarado, 132 Idaho at 249.
Mr. Steelsmith's entire sentence was necessarily imposed at the sentencing hearing,
and it did not include any fine, costs, or license suspension. See id. The district court
was without jurisdiction to impose parts of that sentence at a later date. See id.
Furthermore, as the Idaho Supreme Court held in Coasso/o, and as the Court of
Appeals subsequently affirmed in Goodlett, the district court's authority at the
relinquishment hearing was limited: at most, it could only resume that sentence which
had been already imposed. 6 Coasso/o, 136 Idaho at 142-43; Goodlett, 139 Idaho at

264; see also State v. Thomas, 146 Idaho 592, 594 (2008) (holding, in the revocation of
probation context, which is substantially similar to the relinquishment of jurisdiction,
"upon revocation of the probation the court cannot resentence the defendant' (emphasis
added)); State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008) (same). The district court's only

Even if the State's perspective - that each aspect (fine, cost, and suspension) is an
individual sentence - is appropriate, Coasso/o provides that the district court did not
have the authority to impose those sentences at the relinquishment hearing, since
sentencing occurs before the period of retained jurisdiction begins. Coasso/o, 136
Idaho at 142-43. Therefore, even if the "multiple aspects of sentencing" perspective is
correct, the district court still acted beyond the bounds of its jurisdiction by imposing
those aspects of sentencing at the relinquishment hearing. See id.
6 The State actually implicitly admits that its argument to the contrary is untenable:
"[State v. Ditmars, 98 Idaho 472, 474 (1977)] demonstrates that when a sentence of
retained jurisdiction is pronounced, such pronouncement constitutes the 'imposition' of
sentence . ... " (Resp. Br., p.16.)
5
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other option was to reduce that already-imposed sentence. Id.; State v. Mendenhalf,
106 Idaho 388, 395 (Ct. App. 1984) (the district court's authority is limited to corrections
of the sentence that do not increase the penalty imposed); State v. Bosier, 149 Idaho
664, 668 (Ct. App. 2010) (applying the Mendenhalf rule to prohibit subsequently
increasing the aggregate penalty enforced against that defendant).7

Therefore, the

State's assertion that the district court is allowed to reserve part of the sentencing until
the relinquishment hearing, which could only serve to increase the penalty imposed at
the sentencing hearing, is flatly and directly contradicted by precedent: if a penalty was
not already imposed, the district court does not have the jurisdictional authority to add it
in at the relinquishment hearing.

See, e.g., Mendenhalf' 106 Idaho at 395. As such,

those inappropriate and additional penalties should be vacated. See Bosier, 149 Idaho
at 668.
In this case, the district court imposed Mr. Steelsmith's sentence at the
sentencing hearing. It explicitly excluded fines, costs, or a driver's license suspension.

(See R., p.62.)

The idea that each of these is a separate aspect of sentencing or

sentencing ruling, each of which is imposed separately is palpably absurd, particularly in
light of Coassolo, Alvarado, Goodlett, et al. which clearly hold to the contrary (the district

7 The language in Mendenhalf is particularly telling in this regard. The Court of Appeals
referred to increasing the "aggregate penalty," which suggests that an overall increase
in the quantity of the punishment imposed exceeds the district court's jurisdiction.
See Mendenhall, 106 Idaho at 395; see also Bosier, 149 Idaho at 668 (applying the
Mendenhal! rule to prohibit increasing the aggregate penalty by altering a sentence so
that it would run consecutively instead of concurrently). The Idaho Supreme Court has
specifically recognized that fines and license suspensions constitute punishments at
sentencing. State v. Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 171-72 (2005). As such, adding them
onto an already-imposed sentence at the relinquishment hearing impermissibly
increases the aggregate penalty. See Mendenhall, 106 Idaho at 395; Bosier, 149 Idaho
at 688.
10

court only has jurisdiction to impose a sentence before the period of retained jurisdiction
begins, the entirety of which sentence may only subsequently be resumed at
relinquishment or reduced pursuant to Rule 35).

See, e.g., Coass%, 136 Idaho at

142-43; Good/ett, 139 Idaho at 264.

Finally, exemplifying the State's disregard for precedent with this argument, the
Court of Appeals has considered a district court's attempt to reserve an aspect of
sentencing until after the period of retained jurisdiction and found such an action to be in
error. State v. Banbury, 145 Idaho 265, 269-70 (Ct. App. 2007). In Banbury, the district
court did not order a necessary psychological evaluation prior to sentencing, but
instead, ordered that evaluation to occur during the period of retained jurisdiction, the
impact of which would be considered at the end of the period for retained jurisdiction.
See id. at 267-68. The Court of Appeals held that the mandate of I.C. § 19-2522 (one of

the aspects of sentencing a defendant with a mental health condition) required the
district court to order that evaluation prior to its initial imposition of sentence so as to
assure that information would factor into the imposed sentence. See id. at 269.

This is

true even though the district court expected to revisit the sentence after the period of
retained jurisdiction.

/d.

The critical fact was that the evaluation was necessary to

inform the sentencing decision, a decision which could not be properly rendered at
some time after the imposition of the sentence.

See id. at 268.

As such, delaying

aspects of the sentencing decision or some of the sentencing rulings until after the
period of retained jurisdiction is impermissible. See id. at 268-69; Coass%, 136 Idaho
at 142-43.
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As the district court was only authorized to impose a sentence, which includes all
components and aspects thereof, before the period of retained jurisdiction began, which
it did, its decision to impose the additions of the fine, costs, and suspension was beyond
its jurisdictional authority and therefore, those punishments should be vacated.

See,

e.g., Bosier, 149 Idaho at 668.

2. As Established In Precedent, Mr. Steelsmith's Entire And Final Sentence Was
Executed When He Was Remanded To The Custody Of The County Sheriff
Further demonstrating why the subsequently-imposed punishments should be
vacated, the imposed sentence (without the fine, costs, and suspension) was also
executed.

As recently as 2010, the Idaho appellate courts have held that once the

defendant is remanded to the custody of the Department of Correction, his sentence
has been executed. State v. McGonigal, 122 Idaho 939, 940 (1992); State v. Williams,
126 Idaho 39, 44 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Petersen, 149 Idaho 808, 812-13 (Ct. App.
2010). And, as the Williams Court explained,
Idaho Code § 19-2601 (4) superimposes upon this division of jurisdiction
between the courts and the Board a means by which a court may retain
jurisdiction even after the defendant is in the physical custody of the
Board. By allowing the court to retain jurisdiction for 180 days after the
execution of a sentence has been ordered, Section 19-2601 (4) creates an
exception to the general rule that the court loses jurisdiction from the
moment execution of the sentence begins. The statute enables the court
and the Board essentially to exercise concurrent authority over the
offender for a limited period.
Williams, 126 Idaho at 44 (emphasis added). As the Court of Appeals clearly stated, in

the situation of retained jurisdiction, the sentence is executed, but the district court is
permitted to retain limited jurisdiction (concurrent to that of the board). Id. The board is
not authorized to increase the length of a defendant's sentence.

12

See, e.g.,

State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 391 (1983) (quoting Ex parte Prout, 86 P. 275, 276

(Idaho 1906) for its discussion of the separation of powers, specifically in regard to the
powers of the board of pardons).8
To hold otherwise and allow the district court to increase the amount of
punishment after executing the sentence would permit the Judiciary to usurp a power
reserved specifically to the Executive branch by the Idaho Constitution, specifically,
control over a convicted and sentenced person. State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 163
(2010), abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,895 (2011); State v. Taylor, 142 Idaho 30,31-32 (2005); State v.
Chapman, 121 Idaho 355 (1992). Therefore, the result of this dual jurisdiction is that

the district court's continuing jurisdiction is necessarily limited.

Id.

As explained in

Section 1(8)(1), infra, this limited grant of authority only permits the district courts to
resume the original sentence or reduce it pursuant to Rule 35 when it relinquishes
jurisdiction. Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 142-43; Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 264. Thus, in order
for the coextensive jurisdiction to function within Idaho's constitutional framework,
the sentence must be executed prior to the period of retained jurisdiction.

See, e.g.,

Williams, 126 Idaho at 44. This is consistent with the long-standing principles of Idaho

law:

"The Pedraza principle [that courts may not increase a previously imposed and

suspended sentence upon a violation of probation] ... narrows the range of corrective
sentences to those which will

not increase the aggregate penalty imposed."

8 "Whenever such [80ard of Pardons] undertakes to increase or extend the penalty or
punishment imposed upon a convict by a decree of court, they at once pass beyond the
realm of their jurisdiction and authority .... " Prout, 86 P. at 276.
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Mendenhall, 106 Idaho at 395 (citing State v. Pedraza, 101 Idaho 440 (1980)). As such,
the State's assertion, that the sentence had not been executed, is without merit.
Such a conclusion is also consistent with the statutory language governing
periods of retained jurisdiction, which clearly indicates that the sentence must be
executed before the period of retained jurisdiction begins. See I.C. § 19-2601 (4). The
Legislature provided: "The prisoner will remain committed to the board of correction if
not affirmatively placed on probation by the court." Id. (emphasis added); see Taylor,
142 Idaho at 31-32; Petersen, 149 Idaho at 812.

Because the language specifically

denotes that the person "remains committed to the board," that person must have been
initially committed to the board. 9 See id. (emphasis added). And since the person must
have been initially committed to the board before the period of retained jurisdiction
began, the sentence must have been executed at that time. McGonigal, 122 Idaho at

940; Williams, 126 Idaho at 44.
In addition, the Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed this principle, that when the
district court retains jurisdiction, "[a] defendant's sentence begins when it is imposed by
the court. I.C. § 20-209A ... [T]he 180-day period of retained jurisdiction begins to run
once the sentence is pronounced, regardless of whether the defendant is transported to
the Board immediately or there is some delay." Petersen, 149 Idaho at 813. The only
way such calculations of time frames (i.e., the time for the district court to suspend the
sentence or for the defendant to file an appeal) can permissibly begin from the date of
imposition is if the sentence is also executed at that same time. See id. And while the

9 The statute is clear and unambiguous in this regard, and so this Court must give effect
to that unambiguous language, regardless of whether it approves of the outcome.
Verska, 151 Idaho at 894-95.
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execution may be effectuated at the point of relinquishment (see Resp. Br., p.10), that
does not change the fact that the execution initially occurred upon remand of custody to
the board. Compare State v. Ditmars, 98 Idaho 472,474 (1977), with McGonigal, 122
Idaho at 940; Williams, 126 Idaho at 44; Petersen, 149 Idaho at 812-13.10 Rather, the
commitment which occurs when the district court relinquishes jurisdiction is properly
qualified as the "final commitment to the State Board of Corrections."

See

State v. Schrom, 105 Idaho 769, 772 (1983). To be qualified as a "final commitment,"
there must necessarily have been an "initial commitment."

See id.

That initial

commitment occurs at the sentencing hearing and constitutes the execution of the
sentence. See, e.g., Williams, 126 Idaho at 44; Petersen, 149 Idaho at 812-13.
When, as here, the district court is permitted to retain some limited jurisdiction,
that jurisdiction "did not extend to take other actions, such as enlarging the sentence
after the original judgment of conviction and sentence had become final." See Bosier,
149 Idaho at 667. Both the Legislature and the appellate courts have made it clear that
execution of the sentence in a retained jurisdiction situation occurs before the period of
retained jurisdiction begins. I.C. § 19-2601(4); I.C. § 20-209A; McGonigal, 122 Idaho at
940; Williams, 126 Idaho at 44; Petersen, 149 Idaho at 812-13. They have also made it
clear that any continuing jurisdiction over the sentence is limited to only resuming that

10 It is also important to note that the law in this regard evolved away from the position
articulated in Ditmars in 1977. See McGonigal, 122 Idaho at 940 (decided in 1992):
Williams, 126 Idaho at 44 (decided in 1994); Petersen, 149 Idaho at 812-13 (decided in
2010). Similarly, the Legislature amended I.C. 19-2601 (4) in 1995 to provide that "the
prisoner will remain committed to the board of correction if not affirmatively placed on
probation by the court." 1995 Idaho Session Laws Ch. 247 (emphasis added). As
such, the more accurate statement of the law regarding the execution of the sentence is
that articulated by Mr. Steelsmith.
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which was already imposed or reducing that which was already imposed.

Coassolo,

136 Idaho at 142-43; Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 264; I.C. § 19-2601 (4).
In Mr. Steelsmith's case, the district court explicitly, both in its written order and
in its oral pronouncement, executed the sentence: ''The defendant shall be remanded
to the custody of the Sheriff of Ada County, to be delivered FORTHWITH by him into the
custody of the State of Idaho Board of Correction." (R., p.63 (emphasis in original);
see Tr., p.37, L.23 - p.38, L.1.) Because Mr. Steelsmith's entire sentence was executed
before the period of retained jurisdiction began, the district court was without jurisdiction
to add new punishments or otherwise increase that sentence when it relinquished that
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Williams, 126 Idaho at 44; Petersen, 149 Idaho at 812-13. Its
limited statutory grant of continuing jurisdiction would have allowed it, at most, to
continue the originally-imposed-and-executed sentence (which did not include any fines,
costs, or license suspension). See, e.g., Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 142-43; Goodlett, 139
Idaho at 264. By going beyond that limited jurisdiction, the district court erred and those
punishments added to the sentence without jurisdiction should be vacated.

See

McFarland, 79 Idaho at 266; Bosier, 149 Idaho at 667.

C.

The District Court Committed Fundamental Error Because The Imposition Of The
New Punishments Violated Mr. Steelsmith's Unwaived Federal And State
Constitutional Protections Against Double Jeopardy
By imposing multiple punishments for the same offense, the record clearly

demonstrates that, in addition to exceeding its jurisdictional authority, the district court
also clearly violated Mr. Steelsmith's unwaived federal and state constitutional
protections against double jeopardy, and in doing so, affected the outcome of the
proceedings by increasing his sentence. (See App. Br., pp.12-17.) As such, this Court
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may consider this argument on appeal. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010).
Imposing multiple punishments at a second, subsequent proceeding, even if authorized
by the Legislature, violates the double jeopardy protections. State v. A velar, 132 Idaho
775, 778 (1999).

The State responds with the odd and untenable argument that

Mr. Steelsmith had no legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence imposed at the
sentencing hearing, and so was not originally in jeopardy. (See Resp. 8r., pp.13-15.)
This position is directly contrary to explicit Idaho law, as set forth by the Legislature and
reinforced by judicial precedent, and should, therefore, be rejected.
First and foremost, in a guilty plea context, jeopardy attaches when the
defendant pleads guilty.

State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 896 (1985).

As such, the

minute Mr. Steelsmith' guilty plea was entered and accepted by the district court, the
jeopardy protections attached to his case. See id. Therefore, the State's argument that
jeopardy did not attach to the original sentence (Resp. 8r., p.21 ("Accordingly, under
DiFrancesco,11 former jeopardy did not attach to [Mr.] Steelsmith's sentence in regard

to those matters before the rider review hearing .... ") is meritless.

Jeopardy had

attached to these proceedings upon the entry of the guilty plea. Alanis, 109 Idaho at
896.
The State's only other argument is that the sentence was not final, in that
Mr. Steelsmith had no legitimate expectation of finality in that sentence, and therefore,
could not been placed in double jeopardy. This position, too, is meritless. For the same
reason the sentence must be executed before the period of retained jurisdiction begins,
(see Section 1(8)(2), supra), that sentence must also be final, or at least provide a

11

United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980).
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legitimate expectation of finality therein:

''The prisoner will remain committed to the

board of correction if not affirmatively placed on probation by the court." Id. (emphasis
added); see also Taylor, 142 Idaho at 31-32 (recognizing the same); Petersen, 149
Idaho at 812 (recognizing the same). The board has no authority to increase that term
of commitment.

Prout, 86 P. at 276; see Creech, 105 Idaho at 391.

Similarly, the

district court, at most, may only resume the originally-imposed judgment, not increase it.
Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 142-43; Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 264; Bosier, 149 Idaho at 668.
Since the default result at the end of the period of retained jurisdiction is that the
originally-imposed and executed sentence is continued (as opposed to initiated), that
sentence must necessarily be reliably final. And since that person remains committed
pursuant to the original judgment, his appeal of his sentence is necessarily against the
original Judgment of Conviction.

See, e.g., State v. Longest, 149 Idaho 782, 783-84

(2010). As such, the sentence imposed therein must possess the necessary finality to
constitute an appealable order. I.A.R. 11 (c)(1); see I.A.R. 14. Therefore, the defendant
has, at least, a legitimate expectation in the finality of that sentence because he knows
that it will be the sentence he must serve if no further action is taken by the district
court, he knows that sentence cannot be increased, and he knows that he can
challenge the propriety of the sentence on appeal. See Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 142-43;
Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 264; Bosier, 149 Idaho at 668; Longest, 149 Idaho at 783-84;
I.A.R. 11 (c)(1); I.A.R. 14.
Furthermore, the principle the State cites from DiFrancesco - that the defendant
cannot have a legitimate expectation of finality in an originally-imposed sentence (Resp.
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Br., pp.13-15) - does not undermine Mr. Steelsmith's argument, either because the
principle is inapplicable to his claim or because he had the requisite expectation.
First, the DiFrancesco principle was articulated in the specific situation where
Congress expressly provided that sentences imposed pursuant to a particular statute
could be increased on appeal. See DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136. As all parties were
on notice that, by statutory authority, the imposed sentence was subject to increase,
that sentence could not be relied upon as final until the appeal resolved.

See

DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136; compare, e.g., Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 264 (holding that,
in Idaho, the courts do not have the authority to increase a sentence once imposed).
Therefore, the DiFrancesco rule is appropriately limited to situations where there is an
express grant of power by the Legislature to effect an increase to an imposed sentence
on appeal. 12 See id. The statutes under which Mr. Steelsmith was sentenced do not
have such an express grant of authority. See I.C. §§ 18-8004, 8005(6). Therefore, the
DiFrancesco rule is inapplicable to Mr. Steelsmith's case. 13

However, based on the ruling in Avelar- that, in Idaho, new or additional punishments
imposed at a second proceeding (which would include an appellate proceeding), even if
authorized by the Legislature, violate the constitutional double jeopardy protections
(Avelar, 132 Idaho at 778; see also Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 264) - the rule from
DiFrancesco is further limited to arguments made pursuant to the federal Constitution.
13 As a result, the general rule - that a second or increased punishment for the same act
violates the double jeopardy protections - governs whether Mr. Steelsmith's protections
against double jeopardy were violated. See Avelar, 132 Idaho at 778; Whalen v. United
States, 445 U.S. 684, 703 (1980) (holding that "the Double Jeopardy Clause as
interpreted by Ex parte Lange [85 U.S. 163 (1873)] prevents a sentencing court from
increasing a defendant's sentence for any particular statutory offense, even though the
second sentence is within the limits set by the [L]egislature" (emphasis added)). The
addition of previously-unimposed punishments at the subsequent rider review hearing
constitutes both a second punishment and an increase to the aggregate punishment,
and thus, under the general rule, constitutes a violation of the protections against
double jeopardy.
12
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Second, even if the DiFrancesco rule is applicable to Mr. Steelsmith's case, he
did have a legitimate expectation of finality in his sentence.

For example, the Idaho

Supreme Court recognized in Coassolo that the deprivation of liberty at the sentencing
hearing was constitutionally permissible because the defendant had been afforded due
process during that at that hearing. See Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 142-43. However, it
found that there was no due process right at the relinquishment stage of proceedings
because the State was not effectuating a new liberty deprivation (i.e., depriving the
defendant of more than it had originally deprived him of at the sentencing hearing). Id.
at 143. 14

In order for such a determination to pass constitutional muster, the initial

deprivation must be reliably final.
In addition to the indications of finality identified in Coassolo, Bosier, Longest,
et a/.,15 judgments of conviction (which include sentencing orders) are final judgments

However, in this case, the district court did not deprive Mr. Steelsmith of his liberty or
property (the fines, costs, and suspension) when it was permitted to do so. (See R.,
pp.61-63.) Instead, it effectuated new deprivations when it relinquished jurisdiction (i.e.,
it took more than it had originally taken at the sentencing hearing). (Compare R., pp.6163 with R., pp.68-71.)
This comparison also demonstrates the clear violation in the record itself, as well
as the prejudice (the increased punishment) caused by the violation. As such, it
demonstrates compliance with the second and third prongs of the Perry fundamental
error test. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. There is no evidence in the record that
Mr. Steelsmith ever waived his constitutional protections against double jeopardy. (See
generally R.) Therefore, under Perry, Mr. Steelsmith only need demonstrate a violation
of his constitutional protections against double jeopardy to meet all the prongs of that
test. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. As explained infra and supra, the district court's
actions did, in fact, violate his rights to be free from double jeopardy, imposing a second
and additional punishment for the same actions. See, e.g., Avelar, 132 Idaho at 778.
As a result, this Court has the authority to rule on the merits of this issue as
fundamental error. See id. And since those new and additional penalties violate the
constitutional protections against double jeopardy, this Court should vacate those
penalties.
15 The reasons why, in a case involving a period of retained jurisdiction, a sentence
must be imposed and executed prior to the period of retained jurisdiction (as discussed
14
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for purposes of appeal.

State v. Tucker, 103 Idaho 885, 888 (Ct. App. 1982).

Suspending a sentence for a period of probation does not affect the finality of the
underlying judgment.

Id. (also discussing the fact that, pursuant to I.A.R. Rule 14,16 the

appeal period is enlarged by the period of retained jurisdiction, implying that retaining
jurisdiction would not affect the finality of the judgment of conviction either).
Accordingly, regardless of the outcome of the period of retained jurisdiction, a potential
appeal is against the initially-imposed sentence contained in the original judgment of
conviction. Id.; I.A.R. 14. As such, that initial judgment of conviction and the initiallyimposed sentence therein, must be reliably final.
To that end, an order for the payment of fines and costs alone is considered a
final judgment.

State v. Wagenius, 99 Idaho 273, 276 (1978). As such, the inverse

should also be true - an order for only imprisonment (as was ordered in this case) is
considered a final judgment.

See id.

Furthermore, even if the defendant had not

challenged (or was unable to challenge) the initial punishment, he is not precluded from
challenging the imposition of any additional punishments imposed after the judgment of
conviction has been entered, including costs and fines. See id. (implying that, because
each order constitutes a final, appealable order, the appealability of each order (and the

in depth in Sections 1(8)(1 )-(2), supra), also, by inference, indicate that the sentence
must be final.
16 I.A.R. Rule 14 states:
The time for an appeal from any criminal judgment, order or sentence in
an action is terminated by the filing of a motion within fourteen (14) days of
the entry of judgment .... If, at the time of judgment, the district court
retains jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2601 (4), the length of time
to file an appeal from the sentence contained in the criminal judgment
shall be enlarged by the length of time between entry of the judgment of
conviction and entry of the order relinquishing jurisdiction or placing the
defendant on probation.
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punishments contained therein) is determined separately, thus allowing a challenge to
the additional punishments even without a challenge to the initial imposition of
sanctions). In fact, the only distinguishable order is a withheld judgment because, in
that situation, no sentence is imposed.
As such, the initially-imposed sentence must have the necessary finality (i.e., the
defendant's expectation of finality in that sentence is legitimate) to be appealable.
Therefore, as Mr. Steelsmith would be allowed to challenge the sentence imposed in his
judgment of conviction on appeal, he must necessarily have a legitimate expectation in
the finality of that sentence.
Therefore, these new punishments, imposed at a second proceeding, violated
Mr. Steelsmith's unwaived state and federal constitutional protections against double
jeopardy. Avelar, 132 Idaho at 778. This violation constitutes fundamental error, and
thus, this Court may address this issue on appeal and provide the appropriate remedy
to Mr. Steelsmith.

CONCLUSION
Because the district court imposed the additional penalties of the fine, costs, and
license suspension without jurisdiction to do so, and in violation of the constitutional
protections against double jeopardy, Mr. Steelsmith respectfully requests this Court
vacate those penalties.
DATED this 22 nd day of June, 2012.

L/0L-

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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